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in Early British, French and US Copyright Law
Jane C. Ginsburg*
Introduction
The public domain is all the rage.1 It is invoked to breach copyright’s
encroaching enclosure of what one might grandiloquently call the cultural commons of
the mind. The heralds of our “remix culture”2 deploy the public domain to smash that
icon of the entertainment-industrial complex, the Romantic Author. But even before the
Author became Romantic, he still served as a shill for concentrated industry, then the
printing-bookselling complex.3 Authors’ moral claims of laborious entitlement merely
masked the power grab of the printers. If we speak of a grab, we imply that copyright
was seized from somewhere. So whence, in this account, was copyright wrested? From
the public domain.
It is not my purpose here to take issue with the expanding normative role for the
public domain. I do not for a moment dispute that the public domain is today and should
remain copyright’s constraining counterpart. In its composition, my idea of the public
*
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1
The volume of academic writing on the public domain has vastly increased since the signal articles of
David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, (1981) 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147 and of Jessica
Litman, “The Public Domain”, (1990) 39 Emory L.J. 965. See, e.g., Bernt Hugenholtz and Lucie Guibault,
The Future of the Public Domain (forthcoming 2006) (collection of essays on the public domain from
multiple contributors, including Pamela Samuelson and Julie Cohen); Tyler T. Ochoa, “Origins and
Meanings of the Public Domain”, (2002) 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 215; James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain”, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 68; Mark
Rose, “Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain”,
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75; Pamela Samuelson, “Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats
and Opportunities”, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147 ; Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain”, (1999) 74 N.Y.U L. Rev. 354,
361-62; Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New
York 2001). For a more skeptical view of “commons” discourse, see Anupam Chander and Madhavi
Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain”, (2004) 92 California Law Review 1331..
2
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down
Culture and Control Creativity (New York 2004).
3
See, e.g., Mark Rose, “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship”, in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel (eds.), Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law
(New York 1994), 23, 30 (“it might be said that the London booksellers invented the modern author,
constructing him as a weapon in their struggle with the booksellers of the provinces.”)

domain may differ from some of yours’, but we probably agree that there is and should
be an ever-growing corpus of material over which no author or successor in title may
exercise a private right. What provokes this lecture, by contrast, are what I perceive to be
anachronistic assertions of the “immemorial” quality of today’s aggressive concept of the
public domain.4 Some of these arguments look to me like the Roche-Bobois “provincial”
line of furniture: modern pieces with nicks and wormholes introduced to impart antique
appeal. The normative claims for the public domain should persuade on their own,
without the added patina of ancient precept. I therefore propose to examine what were
the respective domains of author and public at copyright’s inception, in 18th-19th century
Britain, France and America. I acknowledge immediately that the search uncovers more
ambiguity than certainty, more matters for further inquiry than tidy findings. I hope I
will leave you with many questions, and that some of you will rise to the bait of seeking
fuller answers.
I
We might start the inquiry into the respective domains of author and public with
the observation that the term “public domain” did not exist in early copyright law.5 The
phrase is a late arrival, entering English and American copyright discourse in the second
half of the 19th century, apparently borrowed from the French around the time of the
drafting of the Berne Convention in the last quarter of the 19th century.6 In France, the
term had been employed by the mid 19th-century to mean expiration of copyright term.7
When imported into Britain and the US, the term was used in the same way. This does
not mean that the broader concepts that the “public domain” today embraces did not exist
in some form in the eighteenth century, but simply that no single locution conveniently
and universally captured the concept of non property in works of authorship. 18th century
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See, e.g., Ochoa, note 1 above, p. 222; Ronan Deazley, Re-Thinking Copyright (forthcoming 2006); L.
Ray Patterson, “Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use”, (1987) 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 25 (the stationer’s
copyright “purported to preempt” the public domain while the Statute of Anne “created, or at least
reestablished” the public domain); James Boyle, note 1 above, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. pp. 37-40
(arguing that a second enclosure movement is eating away at intellectual property that was previously in
the public domain), Negativeland, “The Public Domain: Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain”,
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 239, 251 (the “ancient, universal view of art’s potential subject matter”
encompassed everything, and has slowly been encroached by the development of capitalism); See also,
Lawrence Lessig, “Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: The Creative Commons” (2003) 55 Fla. L.
Rev. 763, 764 (The public domain is a resource “that creators throughout history have drawn upon
freely.”).
5
See, e.g., Mark Rose, note 1 above, p. 84 (“In the early period, [there was] no positive term in which to
speak affirmatively about the public domain.”)
6
Id., citing Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain”, (1990) 39 Emory L. J. 965, 975 n.60. The treatise
Drone on Copyright (Boston 1879) appears to be one of the first American sources to use the term.
7
See, e.g., Rapport fait au nom de la Commission rassemblée pour la rédaction d’un projet de loi sur la
propriété d’arts, de sciences et des lettres, par le Comte de Ségur, Moniteur du 28 mars 1837, reprinted in 2
Fernand Worms, Etude sur la propriété littéraire, 37 (Paris 1878) (phrase « tomber dans le domaine public
» used to mean expiration of copyright term). By contrast, ten years earlier, the legal encyclopedia, Recueil
alphabétique de Questions de Droit by M. Merlin (4th ed 1828) devotes seven sections and 47 pages to «
domaine public » but all concern public (and formerly royal) lands. See also, M. Merlin, Répertoire de
Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (Paris 1826) pp. 259-327 (same).
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jurists employed terms like “publici juris,”8 or, in France, “propriété publique,”9 but they
may not have meant it in the way some modern expositors use “public domain,” to mean
the non proprietary primordial soup from which we all sup, and freely digesting, bring
forth further expression for the common delectation.
To ascertain the meaning of these terms at copyright’s inception, we might essay
a survey of the author’s domain. If we know what rights the author enjoyed, and on what
basis he enjoyed them, we might better grasp the realm that remains. I recognize that this
approach might be charged with displacing the horse by the cart. But any order of
precedence presents similar problems of barnyard organization, for I might equally well
evoke the conundrum of the chicken and the egg. Did authors’ rights spawn the public
domain, or did copyright hatch from the common? So let’s break out of this maddening
circuit by asking a different question: In the beginning, in Britain, France and the US,
was a published work a public thing?
I start with publication because the printing press gave rise to the conditions to
which copyright and its predecessor privileges responded: the mass, and potentially
uncontrolled, reproduction of copies of works, and the eventual rise of a population
capable of reading them. Back in the days of the medieval scriptoria, copies were few
and readers almost as scarce. Control over access to the physical copy limited the
number of copies that could be made.10 And even then, some monasteries resorted to a
kind of technological measure to prevent unauthorized access and copying: they chained
the books to the walls.11
Almost as soon as there were printing presses there came printing privileges.12
Ruling authorities perceived two problems that privileges might resolve. Publishing
would further the Renaissance revival of the classical authors as well as enhance the
communication of contemporary Latin and vernacular literature and scholarship. But,
along with making desirable works more available, uncontrolled publishing could also
disseminate undesirable ideas. Second, uncontrolled publishing could discourage the
financial undertaking required to print books: second-comers could undercut the profits
of the first to invest in the labor and materials of printing. Limiting the number of
printers would serve both the crown by controlling ideas, and the publisher by controlling
competition. In some States separate authorities addressed censorship and competition.
For example, in France, a royal minister supplied the required “approbation du roi,” but
the bookseller’s guild, the “corporation des libraires,” implemented the “privilège du

8

See, .e.g, speech of Lord Camden in Donaldson v Beckett, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. 953, pp. 997, 999 (1774).
See, e.g., report of Le Chapelier, Archives parlementaires (Assemblée nationale) 13 january 1791 p. 210,
discussed infra part III.
10
As did the expense and labor-intensiveness of copying. See generally, Peter K. Yu, “Of Monks,
Medieval Scribes and Middlemen”, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1, 7.
11
The hooks and chains can still be seen at the monastery of Poblet in Spain.
12
The first printing privileges were granted by the city-state of Venice in the second half of the fifteenth
century. On the history of printing privileges see generally, Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis of American
Patent and Copyright Law (Washington 1967) pp. 12-56; Frank Prager, “A History of Intellectual Property
from 1545 to 1789”, (1944) 26 J Pat. Off. Soc. 711.
9
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roi.”13 In England, however, the Stationers Company ultimately covered both,14 an
unsavory combination which has led some to discredit copyright by emphasizing its
alleged origins in the suppression of sedition and heresy.15 (I say “alleged” because, for
reasons which I hope will become apparent, copyright is not the alter ego of the printing
privilege.)
With the printing privileges in place, a published work would not have been a
“public thing,” because the “public” was not free to copy the work. The literate public
would have been free to read the works and to reap their ideas (or those ideas which
passed political and ideological muster), but it is unlikely at the time that the new copying
technology would have given rise to expectations of public entitlement to make and
distribute copies. On the contrary, a 1677 King’s Bench decision in a suit brought by the
Stationers’ Company, referring to an earlier House of Lords ruling, stated: “printing was
a new invention, and therefore every man could not by the common law have the liberty
of printing law books.”16
But in England the printing privileges lapsed. The licensing act expired in 1695,
and no statutory regime of exclusive rights replaced it until 1710’s Statute of Anne.17 We
might therefore consider whether this period fostered an expectation of non property (or
of public entitlement) in published works which would have supplied the framework for
interpreting the subsequent Statute of Anne. That is, should the Statute of Anne be seen
as derogating from a prior public domain default, or does the statute fit within a
proprietary landscape which persisted despite the expiration of the printing privileges?
Two factors make it unlikely that during this fifteen-year period a concept of the
public domain as first principle, from which exclusive rights derogated, would have taken
root and flowered. First, while the London booksellers who comprised the Stationers
Company no longer enjoyed a royal monopoly, they still maintained a significant
economic and technological advantage. They largely controlled the means of publishing,
and they controlled their membership.18 So long as the guild could discipline its
members into respecting each other’s exclusivity, the conditions for propagating a public
domain would not seem to have been in place.
Second, the lapsing of the Licensing Act terminated the vesting of exclusive
rights in booksellers. But that did not necessarily mean that the concept of exclusive
13

See generally Raymond Birn, “The Profits of Ideas: Privilèges en librairie in Eighteenth-Century
France" (1970-71) 4 Eighteenth-Century Studies, 131.
14 14
See generally Cyprian Blagden, The Stationers' Company: A History 1403–1959 (London 1960).
15
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright Grab”, (Jan. 1996) WIRED, p. 134.
16
Company of Stationers v. Seymour 1677, 1 Mod 256. See also John Feather, Publishing, Piracy and
Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain (1994) p. 46.
17
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or
Purchasers of such Copies, 8 Anne c 19 (1710).
18
For self-regulation within the printing and bookselling trades during the period between the licensing act
and the Statute of Anne, see generally Isabella Alexander, “The Metaphysics of the Law”: Drawing the
Boundaries of Copyright Law 1710-1911 (thesis, Cambridge, 2005) para. [2.3]; Feather, see note 16 above,
pp. 65-66; Blagden, see note 14 above, pp. 175–77.
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rights to copy and disseminate works of authorship died along with the printers’
monopoly. Rather, another claimant to those rights appeared -- the author. As did a
philosophical and legal theory to connect the author to the rights. One might query
whether John Locke would have endorsed the extension of his labor theory of property to
incorporeal property in the writings of authors.19 He did, after all, urge the expiry of the
Licensing Act, largely because he objected to the stationers’ “Monopoly of all the Clasick
Authers and scholers.”20 However, he also supported a limited period (50-70 years) of
post mortem exclusive rights.21 More importantly, in 1695 he collaborated on the text of
a new licensing bill, which did not pass, but which would have vested both initial printing
and reprinting rights in the author. Locke’s draft, written in March 1695, appears to
accept the premise of authorial proprietary rights: the text provides that the prohibition on
printing was “to secure the Authors property in his copy.”22 This proposal is the
precursor to the Statute of Anne, the first enactment to place the exclusive right initially
in the hands of the authors rather than of printer-booksellers.
By the late seventeenth-century, authors’ claims may, therefore, have been
recognized as a matter of natural justice. But does natural justice translate into
enforceable rights? Before authors were vested with statutory rights, could they advance
a common law claim to exclusive rights in their works? Authors’ common law claims
could have occupied what might otherwise have been a legal vacuum (albeit not a de
facto vacuum) when the Licensing Act lapsed. However, I have found no case preceding
the Statute of Anne in which an author alleged a trespass of his property rights in a
published, or unpublished, work. Stationers’ Company practice recognized authorial
rights in unpublished manuscripts, for the booksellers paid contemporary authors for the
exclusive right to print their works.23 That right, nonetheless, might be said to stem from
the author’s control over the physical manuscript; the booksellers’ practices do not
necessarily evidence a common law property right in the author’s disembodied words.24
That authors might enjoy enforceable incorporeal property rights in their works may well
have been a new concept.25 The term “literary property” appears to have been coined
19

See, e.g., Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge 1993) p. 33
John Locke, Memorandum (1694) against the renewal of the licensing act, reprinted in ES de Beer (ed)
The Correspondence of John Locke (Oxford 1979), vol. 5, pp. 785-91. Self-interest may have played some
role in Locke’s objections: a bookseller’s previously-grated printing privilege in Aesop’s Fables blocked
Locke’s endeavor to publish his own edition. See Lewis Hyde, “Frames from the Framers: How America’s
Revolutionaries Imagined Intellectual Property”, (2005) Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Research
Paper No. 2005-08, 1, 11.
21
Id.
22
See Appendix to ES De Beer, note 20 above, p. 795. See generally, Laura Moscati, “Un “Memorandum”
di John Locke tra Censorship et Copyright” (2003) LXXVI Rivista di storia del diritto italiano 69.
23
See, e.g., Feather, note 16 above, p. 67.
24
See, e.g., William Enfield, “Observations on Literary Property”, (1774) p. 30 reprinted in, The Literary
Property Debate: Eight Tracts, 1774-1775 (London 1974) ( “The truth seems to be, that although the
purchasing of a single copy may give the purchaser possession of the sentiments and expressions of a work,
that is, of the composition itself, it doth not give him such absolute possession of it as to entitle him to …
the right of multiple copies”)
25
For the evolution of the concept of incorporeal property rights in works of authorship, see generally Brad
Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience,
1760–1911, (Cambridge 1999) pp. 19-35. For the parallel, albeit later, evolution in France, see Laurent
20
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around 1707, when it was invoked in a petition from members of the Company to the
House of Commons as part of the Stationers’ ongoing attempt to restore the expired
Licensing Act.26 In an earlier version of the Statute of Anne, from 1710, the preamble
vaunts the rights of “Authors . . . in whom ye undoubted Property of such Books and
Writing as the product of their learning and labour remains . . ..”27 If the concept of
authorial property had not by 1710 received judicial imprimatur, the proposition that
authors’ intellectual labor justified a right perhaps cognizable at common law seems at
least to have gained currency.
II
If authors’ rights did not detract from a preexisting public domain, we might
nonetheless posit that the Statute of Anne created both copyright proprement dit (that is
exclusive rights arising out of the creations of authors rather than compensating or
encouraging printers’ investments) and the concomitant public domain. For if the statute
delineated the author’s domain (and, derivatively, the bookseller’s, too), then everything
the statute left out might be deemed publici juris. But that is taking a highly positivist
view of the Statute of Anne. Whether or not literary property wasn’t property before the
statute, the effect of an interpretation that makes the statute the sole source of authors’
rights is to create (or perpetuate) a vast zone of non property encircling the statute.
Copyright becomes a little coral reef of private right jutting up from an ocean of public
domain. In fact, the respective domains of author and public appear to have been much
less clearly marked. Sticking with aquatic landscapes, we might say that the realm of
copyright was a shoreline of uncertain contours. The Statute of Anne may have separated
the waters from the lands, but it did not clearly tell us which was which.
I propose four ways to ascertain whether authors’ rights were confined to the
contours of the statute. Two address the existence of copyright, the others its scope. If
the Statute of Anne furnished the sole basis for literary property, then the following
propositions should be true:
1. Subject matter not included within the statute was not protected
2. Protection for covered subject matter depended on compliance with statutory
formalities
3. Rights not included within the statute were not protected
4. The duration of rights was limited to the statutory term
As we will see, only the last of these ultimately proved to be correct, and it was hotly
debated, even deplored, at the time by significant expositors of the common law.28 More
importantly, resolution of the duration issue did not fully contain the author’s domain.
Pfister, « La propriété littéraire est-elle une propriété? Controverses sur la nature du droit d’auteur au XIXe
siècle », (July 2005) 205 RIDA 117
26
See Feather, note 16 above, p. 56.
27
Id.
28
See infra at TAN xx. In the US, Donaldson was also criticized by the legal academy, see James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law, (Boston 1826) part V, lecture XXXVI pp. 314-15.
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English judges continued both to grant extra-statutory protections, and to interpret
hospitably claims that pushed the limits of statutory scope.
1. Subject matter
The Statute of Anne covered “any book,”29 a term the text did not define. A later
enactment, the 1735 Hogarth’s Act,30 provided for exclusive rights in prints and
engravings. One might infer from the passage of a law specifically directed at certain
works of art that “book” was limited to literary works, in book form, that is, in sheets
printed and bound. Moreover, if the statute were creating new proprietary rights
subtracted from the public domain, one might anticipate that the statutory grant would be
narrowly construed. Most of the early cases did concern literary works in book form, but
not all. Some of them addressed unpublished letters31 and manuscripts,32 an unpublished
play,33 published roadmaps34 and, finally, musical compositions,35 including music sold
as single sheets.36 In the cases of maps and musical compositions, a generous reading of
“book” could bring them within the statute, but the technique of statutory interpretation
implied a property-friendly premise inconsistent with a view of copyright as derogating
from a public domain default and therefore compelling narrow construction. Indeed, to
fit musical compositions within “any book,” Lord Mansfield in his 1777 decision in Bach
v Longman elevated the statute’s preamble, which referred to “books and other writings,”
into operative language,37 though the actual provisions of the Act consistently specified
only “books.”
Similarly, beginning in 1741 with Alexander Pope’s suit against Edmund Curl for
unauthorized publication of letters written by Pope and sent to recipients from whom
Curl apparently obtained them,38 the English courts routinely enjoined the unauthorized
publication of letters and manuscripts.39 A manuscript might be considered a “book” (or
an incipient one), and might also be assimilated to a chattel under its author’s physical
dominion. But letters were both less book-like, thus less clear candidates for statutory
29

8 Anne c. 19 s 1.
An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and other Prints,
by vesting the Properties thereof in the Inventors and Engravers, during the Time therein mentioned, 8 Geo.
II c.13 (1735).
31
See, e.g., Pope v. Curl, [1741] 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 .
32
See, e.g., Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, [1758] 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 924; Southey v.
Sherwood, [1817] 2 Mer 435, 173 Eng. Rep. 1006.
33
Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] Amb 694, 27 Eng. Rep. 451.
34
Carnan v. Bowles, [1786] 2 Bro CC 80, 28 Eng. Rep. 45 and 1 Cox 283; 29 Eng. Rep. 1168, Cary v.
Faden, [1799] 5 Ves 24, 31 Eng. Rep. 453, Cary v. Longman and Rees, [1801] 1 East 358, 102 Eng. Rep.
138.
35
Bach v. Longman, [1777] 2 Cowp 263, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274.
36
Clementi v. Golding, [1809] 2 Camp 25, 170 Eng. Rep. 1069; Clementi v. Goulding, [1809] 11 East 244,
103 Eng. Rep. 998.
37
2 Cowp. at 624, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1274.
38
Pope v. Curl, [1741] 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608..
39
Id.; Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, [1758] 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 924; Southey v. Sherwood,
[1817] 2 Mer 435, 173 Eng. Rep. 1006; Perceval v. Phipps, [1813] 2 Ves & Beam. 19, 24, 35 Eng. Rep.
225, 277; Thompson v. Stanhope, [1774] Ambler R. 737. 740, 27 Eng. Rep. 476, 477; Gee v. Pritchard and
Anderson, [1818] 2 Swan 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 679.
30
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coverage; and, having been sent to their intended recipients, had left the physical control
of their authors. A traditional trespass claim thus would have been rather attenuated. But
neither of these features gave Lord Harwicke difficulty. Since the defendant had
assembled Pope’s separate letters into a book, the statute’s “book” condition was held to
have been met. The chancellor followed this sleight of hand with another, by declaring
that “any other learned work” was within the statute, including those their authors never
intended to be published. He then established that a “learned work” need not aspire to
pedagogy (or pedantry); informal letters on familiar subjects could do great service to
mankind as well. He surmounted the chattel problem with similarly vaulting ease. Yes,
the recipient had the “property of the paper,” but the author’s dispatch of the physical
medium did not transfer the property in the words. The right of first publication thus was
distinct from the ownership of the letter or the manuscript. Lord Hardwicke’s distinction
evidences the growing recognition that incorporeal subject matter can be the object of
property. As Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman have demonstrated for British copyright,
and Laurent Pfister for French copyright, this conceptualization did not come easily: 18th
century British copyright skeptics found the term “literary property” oxymoronic,
deriding it as “property in nonsense.”40
2. Formalities
Was the first publication right a statutory property right or a common law
property right? The Statute of Anne vested in authors the right of “printing” as well as
“reprinting;” the former could have covered first publication. The overall focus of the
statute, however, was directed towards the regulation of the printed, published copies -and the guild that purveyed them. Indeed, the printer/bookseller-centrism of the Statute
of Anne has led many scholars to conclude that the figure of the author, having lent
rhetorical flair to the preamble and moral appeal to the preceding lobbying,41 was nearly
irrelevant to the actual regime the Statute established.42 Part of that regime included the
conditioning of the statute’s remedies on compliance with formalities.
These
requirements, notably registration of the work with the Stationers Company upon
publication, were per se irrelevant to unpublished works.43 The role of formalities in a
copyright system can tell us a lot about the premises underlying protection. If copyright
is conditioned on compliance with formalities, then the right may be viewed in purely
positivistic terms. No registration, no right, full stop. The policy underlying registration
and similar notice-giving formalities is set out in the Statute of Anne:
whereas many persons may through ignorance offend against this Act, unless
some provision be made whereby the property in every such book , as is intended
by this act to be secured to the proprietor or proprietors thereof may be
ascertained . . . That nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to extend to
40

Sherman & Bently, see note 25 above, p. 19 n.31, quoting An Enquiry Into the Nature and Origin of
Literary Property, attributed to William Warburton (London, printed for Wiliam Flexney 1762).
41
See, e.g., Mark Rose, note 19 above.
42
See, e.g.; Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville 1968) p. 147 (suggesting
that giving the right to authors was merely a convenient means to attack the stationers’ monopoly); Feather,
see note 16 above, p. 51.
43
See 8 Anne c 19 section 2. Moreover the term of protection ran from first publication, see section 1.
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subject any bookseller, printer or other person whatsoever, to the forfeitures or
penalties therein mentioned . . . unless the title to the copy of such book or books
hereafter published, shall, before such publication, be entered in the Register
Book of the Company of Stationers . . .44
If the drafters of the statute feared that “persons [might] through ignorance offend
against” the author’s or proprietor’s exclusive rights, that might imply that, absent
registration of the work, the public was entitled to assume that the work was free to be
printed or reprinted. In other words, the default position, away from which the author or
proprietor must educate the public through proper registration, would be free
appropriability. This in turn would suggest a skeptical and skimping view of the
proprietary right.
The caselaw, however, indicates a different view. Non compliance with
formalities seems not to have been raised as a defense when the claim concerned an
unpublished work. Arguably, one who publishes an unpublished manuscript knows that
he is invading the author’s right. But, at least until Lord Hardwicke bifurcated the
property rights in unpublished letters,45 it is not apparent that the recipient of a letter
would have known that he was offending against the statute if he published the words the
author had purposefully communicated to him. If unpublished letters were intended to be
within the Statute of Anne, then the rationale for the formalities should have extended to
them. If unpublished letters were not within the statute, then the author’s claim must
have lain in the common law of trespass, and the statute would not have supplanted that
claim. In the latter event, the statute could not have defined the entire universe of
enforceable literary property.
There is an additional explanation for the weakness of formality-based defenses,
and consequently of the positivistic concept of copyright that formalities imply: even
when it came to published works, the courts concluded that formalities conditioned only
the special statutory remedies; common law remedies remained available when the author
or proprietor had not registered the work with the Stationers Company.46 Thus, the
statutory claim sat atop an established common law structure, enhancing, but not
defining, the available relief. This observation, however, supports two conflicting
44
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conclusions. The first conclusion would be that the courts’ resort to common law
remedies demonstrates that a common law right pre-existed the statute, and persisted
concurrently. The second, competing, conclusion would be that when parliament creates
a new right, it is assumed that remedies will be available to enforce it, whether or not the
statute expressly includes remedies.47 Thus, any statutorily-created right can be enforced
by common law remedies, in addition to whatever specific relief the statute sets out.
To determine whether a common law basis for proprietary rights ran concurrently
with, or instead was subsumed within the statute, we turn to the third proposition, that the
statute articulates the full and sole scope of the right.
3. Scope of the right
The Statute of Anne vested authors and proprietors with the rights to print, reprint
and sell. In modern copyright parlance, these are the rights to reproduce and distribute
the work.48 If these are the only legally cognizable rights, we would expect courts to
reject any claims to protect a work against unauthorized public performance, or against
unauthorized adaptation. Once again, the caselaw serves up an ambiguous response.
We will first consider the scope of the rights to print and reprint. Were these
limited to dissemination of copies of the work in the same form and with the same
contents as originally published, then partial copying or revision of the prior work would
not have been held to infringe. The contrast of the Statute of Anne with Hogarth’s Act
could have supplied further textual support for crimping the concept of “printing and
reprinting” in the Statute of Anne to integral copying. Hogarth’s Act forbade
reproducing the protected image “in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or
diminishing from the main design.”49 It also targeted persons who “shall print, reprint or
import for sale, . . . any such prints, or any parts thereof.”50 The booksellers themselves
seem to have appreciated the potential consequences of the absence from the Statute of
Anne of “or any parts thereof” language. They petitioned parliament in 1735 for
amendments extending the prohibition to unauthorized publication “in parcels at different
times and in different publications,” apparently in response to the growing practice of
magazine serialization. This bill having failed, the booksellers petitioned two years later,
also unsuccessfully, for a three-year embargo on unauthorized translations and
abridgements.51 The legislative record thus seems to favor narrow construction of the
scope of the reproduction right in books.
The courts did, shortly following Hogarth’s Act and the rejection of the
booksellers’ bills, devise a doctrine of “fair abridgement,” permitting second-comers to
update, correct, summarize, or partially copy copyrighted works. The basis of the fair
47
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abridgement rule, however, seems to me more consistent with a labor-based property
concept than with a narrow application of statutory text. In the 1740 decision in Gyles v
Wilcox,52 concerning the alleged copying of a law book, Lord Hardwicke considered
whether “all abridgements” should “be brought within the meaning of this act of
parliament.” Hardwick rejected a narrow interpretation of the statute, for reasons worth
repeating here:
As to what has been said . . . of the acts being a monopoly, and therefore ought to
receive strict construction, I am quite of a different opinion, and that it ought to
receive a liberal construction, for it is very far from being a monopoly, as it is
intended to secure the property of books in the authors themselves, or the
purchasers of the copy, as some recompence for their pains and labour in such
works as may be of use to the learned world.53
Isabella Alexander has recently written eloquently regarding the public interest (“use to
the learned world”) aspects of Lord Hardwicke’s reasoning in this decision, and of early
British copyright in general.54 I propose to focus on the “recompense for [authorial]
pains and labour.” Lord Hardwicke stated that books that “are colourably shortened
only” were “undoubtedly within the meaning of the act of parliament, and are a mere
evasion of the statute.” But a “fair abridgement” falls outside the act in that a “real and
fair abridgement . . . may with great propriety be called a new book, because . . . the
invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them.”55 In other words,
because he has expended mental labor, a fair abridger is an author, too. The labor
rationale that justifies the first author’s property also confines it. The colorable shortener
(or, to use Justice Story’s later US characterization of the same lowlife figure, the facile
user of the scissors56) is not an author because he has contributed nothing of his own to
the prior work. In the case of a fair abridgement, by contrast, we encounter not an
absence of property rights, but two contending property rights, both arising out of
“invention, learning, and judgment.”
The fair abridgement doctrine created a conceptual difficulty as challenging as the
recognition of incorporeal property. If the fair abridger is an author, he cannot at the
same time be an infringer. But if he cannot be an infringer, then, absent express statutory
provision of an adaptation right, the statutory reproduction right will not reach
unauthorized abridgements and revisions of works even when these may prejudice both
the author’s economic interest, by underselling the longer versions, and his moral
interests by, as Lord Hardwicke recognized, “mistaking and curtailing the sense of an
author.”57 It took almost one hundred years for the British courts to devise an adaptation
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right, a reconceptualization achieved in the House of Lords’ 1835 decision in d’Almaine v
Boosey.58 There is an understandable economic impetus behind the Lords’ extension of
the opera composer’s copyright to encompass re-orchestrations of selections into dance
tunes. By 1835, a significant middle class with the means to purchase and perform music
at home had emerged, thus creating a market for derivative versions of musical works.
(The same factors may have contributed to the 1809 King’s Bench ruling in Clementi v
Goulding that a single sheet of music was a “book.”59) But d’Almaine’s rationale
confronts head-on the conflicting claims of the second author -- and overcomes them by
denigrating the quality of the adapter’s authorship: “The original air requires the aid of
genius for its construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation or
accompaniment.”60 If the second author is a genius-free mechanic, in other words, if he
not really an author, then he can be an infringer. Anne Barron has pointed out that
d’Almaine may be the first English judicial recognition of the Romantic Author.61 For
our purposes, d’Almaine closes the circle the courts created in Gyles v Wilcox:
articulating the scope of the author’s rights not in terms of statutory text, but with
reference to the nature of the second author’s labor.
The other right we will explore is even more clearly extra-statutory. The Statute
of Anne did not provide for public performance rights. This is understandable in light of
its focus on the printing trade. But if a play were performed without authorization, what
recourse would its author or proprietor (in this case, the theater manager) have? The few
cases decided before parliament enacted a performance right in 183362 are inconclusive.
The earliest, Coleman v Wathen,63 decided by the King’s Bench in 1793, concerned an
unauthorized performance of a play. The defendant had apparently memorized the
plaintiff’s work, An Agreeable Surprise, while it was being performed, and then to
plaintiff’s disagreeable surprise, performed it on a rival stage. The plaintiff cried
“piracy!” and argued both that the performance should be considered a publication within
the Statute of Anne, and that the author had rights independently of the Statute. The
court dismissed the claim, stating that the performance was not a publication. The two
succinct opinions do not address the claim of extra-statutory rights, but their silence may
be interpreted as rejecting the second line of argument as well.
By contrast, in Morris v Harris (1814)64 and Morris v Kelly (1820),65 injunctions
issued against the unauthorized performance of published plays, but no reasoning is given
as to the legal basis for the restraint. Finally, in Murray v Elliston,66 the King’s Bench in
1822 addressed a claim arising out of an unauthorized performance of a tragedy
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published by Lord Byron. The defendant cited Donaldson v Beckett67 (of which more
momentarily) and Coleman v Wathen68 to assert that no remedy could exist outside the
statute, and the statute did not extend to performance rights. But the defendant then
advanced an additional rationale for dismissing the action. Expounding on “the nature of
copyright,” defendant’s counsel urged:
The injury then which an author sustains by the violation of his copyright is this;
that a stranger, without permission, disposes of the use and possession of this, his
book, and thereby receives the profits to which he, the author, is justly entitled. If
then the book be not in all reasonable strictness such as may be called the author’s
own book, as if it be a bona fide abridgement, Gyles v Wilcox shews that the
author has no remedy. Now, in the present case, a theatrical exhibition falls
within the principle above laid down. Persons go thither, not to read the work, or
to hear it read, but to see the combined effect of poetry, scenery, and acting. Now
of these three things, two are not produced by the author of the work, and the
combined effect is just as much a new production, and even more so than the
printed abridgement of a work.69
The court’s laconic (or laconically reported) dismissal of the action offers a clue to which
of the two arguments the judges may have found most persuasive: “an action cannot be
maintained . . . for publicly acting and representing the said tragedy, abridged in the
manner aforesaid . . .” 70 I suggest we have here not an absence of statutory rights, but
an excess of conflicting common law claims.
4. Duration
We turn now to the last of our four propositions, addressing the duration of
copyright. Here, the statute definitively trumped any pre-existing or concurrent common
law rights. I do not propose to re-tell the oft-told tale of Donaldson v Beckett,71 nor to
enter the fray of sorting out which judge voted which way on the five propositions put to
them:72 whether copyright existed at common law before publication; whether it existed
at common law after publication; whether the Statute of Anne took away the common
law right; whether the common law right was perpetual; whether the Statute of Anne took
away the perpetual right.73 We do – more or less -- know the bottom line: whether or not
common law copyright was perpetual and persisted past publication, the Statute of Anne
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limited the copyright term, at least for published works, to the 14 years provided by the
statute, with an additional 14 years if the author were still living at the expiration of the
first term. Because the peers did not address the five questions put to the judges, and
most of them gave no reasons at all for their votes,74 we do not know which if any of the
following propositions Donaldson v Beckett stands for: that there was no common law
copyright; that any common law copyright expired upon publication; that the Statute of
Anne preempted common law copyright entirely; that the Statute of Anne preempted
common law copyright to the extent it overlapped with statutory copyright, but left
untouched those areas not specifically addressed by the statute.75
The controversy over common law copyright that culminated in Donaldson is also
known as the “battle of the booksellers,”76 but some of its most heated rhetoric concerned
authors. These included the lofty pronouncements of Lord Mansfield and Blackstone, 77
as well as interested parties’ broadsheets, extolling authors’ labor-based claims to literary
property.78 The other side tended to emphasize the public interest in the spread of ideas79
(though literary propertarians never asserted a copyright claim to ideas as such).80 Lord
Camden’s speech in Donaldson, if carefully excerpted, would take pride of place on
anyone’s Top Ten list of public domain advocacy. For example:
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If there be anything in the world common to all mankind, science and learning are
in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and general as air or
water. They forget their Creator, as well as their fellow creatures, who wish to
monopolize his noblest gifts and greatest benefits. Why did we enter into society
at all, but to enlighten one another’s minds, and improve our faculties, for the
common welfare of the species? Those great men, those favoured mortals, those
sublime spirits, who share that ray of divinity which we call genius, are intrusted
by Providence with the delegated power of imparting to their fellow-creatures that
instruction which heaven meant for universal benefit; they must not be niggards to
the world, or hoard up for themselves the common stock.81
But read a little further, and we discover a less seductive vision. Lord Camden goes on to
lament filthy lucre’s defilement of the pristine calling of authorship:
Glory is the reward of science, and those who deserve it, scorn all meaner views: I
speak not of the scribblers for bread, who teaze the press with their wretched
productions; fourteen years is too long a privilege for their perishable trash. It
was not for gain that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighted the
world; it would be unworthy of such men to traffic with a dirty bookseller for so
much a sheet of letter press.82
Given the rise of the professional author in the 18th century, this feature of Lord
Camden’s oration was retrograde even its day.83 As Catherine Macaulay then wryly
observed, the need to pay the “sordid butchers and bakers . . . are evils which the sublime
flights of poetic fancy do not always soar above.”84 Camden’s stance, and the outcome
in the case, also evoked the ire of legal commentators of the time. Gilles Jacob’s 1797
Law Dictionary attributes to Cambridge law don Edward Christian the confrontational
assertion that because Donaldson “was contrary to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, of the
learned Commentator [(Blackstone)], and of several other judges . . . every person may
still be permitted to indulge his own opinion upon the propriety of it, without incurring
the imputation of arrogance.”85 And such indulgences abounded. In his forthcoming
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book, Ronan Deazley conjures up a virtual conspiracy of early nineteenth-century
commentators committed to undermining the public domain by diminishing Donaldson’s
impact.86
III
Let us leave the cabal of British commentators and travel across the Channel to
consider how the French envisioned the respective domains of author and public. French
copyright today is generally considered, at least by “les anglo-saxons” -- by which the
French curiously mean anglo-americans -- to be fundamentally authorial propertyoriented.87 Even the public domain, in the strict sense of copyright-expired works, is not
absolutely property-free: authors’ moral rights are perpetual, and can be invoked to
protect the integrity of works whose authors have been dead well past the statutory postmortem period.88 The risk of rampaging moral rights-bearing remote heirs is not
theoretical, as the publishers of a purported sequel to Les Misérables learned recently to
their dismay.89
But it was not always thus. Of the three copyright systems here reviewed,
France’s was at first the closest to acknowledging a public domain default, emphasizing
the public’s property as the backdrop to private rights. Like England, France had a
longstanding regime of printing privileges. These, however, ended not with the whimper
of the lapsing of the Licensing Act, but with the bang of the night of August 4, 1789, and
the general abolition of all privileges.90 Whatever the lingering de facto power of the
corporation des libraries de Paris, de jure and politically the message was clear:
henceforth, the press is free, not only of censorship, but also of proprietary claims.
The first French copyright enactment did not restore private rights in printed
works; instead it created a dramatists’ public performance right. This was not the
principal motivation for the Law of January 13, 1791. Its reporter, Le Chapelier, was the
moving spirit behind, and gave his name to, a later 1791 law dissolving guilds and
corporations. So it should be no surprise that most of his report and the ensuing law
aimed to repulse the pretensions of the Comédie française, whose members sought to
retain their monopoly over the works of Corneille, Molière and Racine. Indeed, it
appears from the report that the dramatists’ first objective was to destroy the comédiens’
86
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exclusivity. The dramatists appear to have situated their second demand, for control over
their works, within the rhetoric of the public domain. According to the report, the
dramatists’ petition
in seeking for the authors and their heirs or grantees the fullest property in their
works during their life and five years following their death, recognizes and even
invokes the rights of the public, and does not hesitate to admit that after the fiveyear period, the authors’ works are a public property.91
Turning, after much execration of the Comédiens, to the dramatists’ property right, Le
Chapelier opened with a ringing affirmation of the principle of authorial property:
The most sacred, the most legitimate, the most indisputable, and if I may say so,
the most personal of all properties is the work which is the fruit of a writer’s
thoughts.
This excerpt also makes the top ten list for selective quotation, however, because
property-enthusiasts tend to leave Le Chapelier at this rhetorical high point, before he lets
the other shoe drop.92 He continues:
But it is a property of a different kind from all the other properties. [Once the
author has disclosed the work to the public] the writer has affiliated the public
with his property, or rather has fully transmitted his property to the public.
However, because it is extremely just that men who cultivate the domain of ideas
be able to draw some fruits of their labors, it is necessary that, during their whole
lives and some years after their deaths, no one may, without their consent, dispose
of the product of their genius. But also, after the appointed period, the public’s
property begins, and everyone should be able to print and publish the works that
have contributed to enlighten the human spirit.93
Article 2 of the proposed law declares that the works of authors who have been dead for
five years “are a public property.”94 Thus there is no ambiguity about the end point of the
author’s domain. Moreover, Le Chapelier’s concept of the public domain appears more
extensive than expiration of term. The public’s property interest is incipient as soon as
the author discloses his work. Authors’ labors justify their temporary property rights, but
the public’s more fundamental claims form an ever-present background.
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France did not enact a reproduction right until 2 years later,95 though laws were
proposed in the interim, one of which strongly emphasized authors’ proprietary rights,
melding a variety of justifications, including France’s debt to the writings of authors that
shaped “the opinion that smashed all forms of despotism in France.”96 This proposal
included special statutory remedies more rugged than the Statute of Anne’s damasking of
infringing copies. An infringer would be exposed in the public square for three hours,
chained to a placard labeled “thief infringer.”97 -- An idea for record companies’ pursuit
of file sharers?
The 1793 Report of Lakanal accompanying the law installing a reproduction right
begins defensively, deeming property in the “productions of genius” the “least
contestable, the one whose increase cannot harm republican equality, nor offend liberty.”
The rhetoric then grows warmer, extolling “such a great revolution as ours” for making
clear the simple justice of recognizing that property right. Lakanal later rebuts Le
Chapelier’s characterization of a published work as a “propriété publique”: it makes no
sense, he contends, for the author’s right to disappear at the very moment at which he
exercises it. Perhaps referring to Lord Camden’s elevation of the author who writes only
for glory, Lakanal contemptuously dismisses that notion, querying, “By what stroke of
fate must it be that the man of genius, who devotes his waking hours to the instruction of
his fellow citizens, might look forward only to a sterile glory, and might not claim the
legitimate tribute of such noble work?”98
We can see that revolutionary rhetoric deliberately paired the author’s domain
with the advancement of revolutionary ideals. Authors deserve exclusive rights not only
because they bring forth the products of “genius,” but particularly because that genius
bears a strongly republican stamp. But the concept of “propriété publique” was also a
revolutionary rallying cry. It instituted what Professor Carla Hesse has called “a ‘public
domain’ of democratic access to a common cultural inheritance.”99 The concept lingers
in the text of the laws, particularly regarding the role of formalities. The 1792 law
amending the public performance right conditioned the vesting of the right on compliance
with a notice-giving obligation.100 The 1793 law conferring reproduction rights imposed
a requirement of deposit of copies with the national library.101 It is difficult to discern
from the sparse caselaw addressing formalities whether French courts perceived them as
conditions precedent to acquiring rights, or instead as means of perfecting pre-existing
rights necessary to initiate an infringement action,102 or yet instead as a condition
subsequent whose non fulfillment would divest the author of the copyright he initially
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enjoyed.103 That the question was raised at all nonetheless indicates that the courts were
uncertain of the boundary between the author’s domain and the public’s.
By contrast, two of our other tools for separating the author’s domain from the
public’s -- subject matter and scope of rights – delineate a capacious authorial
exclusivity, because the 1793 act grandly extended to “écrits en tout genre” (writings of
all kinds);104 and the combination of the 1791 and 1793 acts covered the waterfront of
rights, which may explain why France did not supplant these texts with a more fully
developed code until 1957.
As for our fourth yard-stick, duration, we have seen that the term, while
potentially much longer than the Statute of Anne’s, was unambiguously terminal. The
Statute of Anne provided for 14 years from publication, “and no longer”105 unless the
author was still living at the end of that time, in which case another 14 years attached.106
But until Donaldson, it was vigorously argued that the cutoff applied only to the special
statutory remedies, not to the existence of the property right itself.107 In France, because
the positive law was clear, the advocates of perpetual copyright pressed their case before
the legislature. The period from the decree of 1 Germinal year XIII (1804) creating
exclusive rights in posthumously published works, to the law of 1866 setting the term of
copyright at life + 50 (where it largely remained until the EU Duration Directive of 1993
added another 20 years) saw increasingly acrimonious debates over the nature of
copyright.108 Perpetualists argued that authors’ rights were property, and property rights
must, by their nature, endure forever.109 Their antagonists, whom I’ll dub public
domainists, emphasized that the rights contended-for were by their nature incorporeal and
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therefore incapable of ownership.110 A copyright thus could only be a contract between
the author and society, in which the author received a limited term of exclusivity in
recompense for his contributions to society. Joseph Prudhon, of notorious hostility to
property in general, thundered against one of the draft perpetual copyright bills:
By enacting such a law, the legislature will have done far worse than paying the
author an exorbitant price, it will have abandoned the principle of the chose
publique, of the intellectual domain, and at great harm to the community. … Let
us not disinherit humanity of its domain . . . Intellectual property does not merely
encroach on the public domain; it cheats the public of its share in the production
of all ideas and all expressions.111
The Conseiller d’Etat Riché, reporting on the 1866 law, also emphasized the
communal features of works of authorship, echoing Le Chapelier:
[Upon publication] the work is given over to the public; the author’s property
becomes a thing in common to all who encounter it . . . It is no longer the property
of its producer, this thing which grows and multiplies the further it goes from its
producer. In the nature of things there is no literary property right in a work once
it has been given over to the public. The nature of things has created the opposite
of property, it has created a divestiture.112
As Professor Laurent Pfister has observed, a great deal of nineteenth-century French
copyright (or anti copyright) rhetoric sounds a lot like today’s cyber-libertarian
“copyleft” avant la lettre.113 But Riché, while denigrating the concept of literary
property nonetheless urged adoption of a law which, albeit not perpetual, installed one of
the longest copyright terms in the world. This is one of the paradoxes of nineteenthcentury French copyright before the advent of moral rights: much of the rhetoric sought
as a matter of principle to diminish the moral claims of author’s rights by situating them
in a broader landscape of the public interest. But in practice the positive law was
considerably more protective than the UK’s or the US.’
IV
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We come, at last, to the United States. In the first flush of freedom from England,
the Continental Congress at Noah Webster’s urging (not to say pestering),114 in turn
urged the States to enact copyright laws to promote the production of instructive works of
authorship. The pre-Constitutional copyright statutes revealed multiple motivations,
mixing Statute of Annesque encouragements of learned men to write useful books with
strong affirmations of authors’ labor-based natural property rights.115 The Constitutional
copyright clause also melds public domain and authorial property rationales. It
empowers Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and discoveries.”116 The goal of the property right is to enhance public knowledge, but
the rights – though limited in time -- are “secure[d],” not “granted,” by Congress. As we
shall see, the Supreme Court in 1834 declined to read “secured” to advert to a concurrent
common law property right regime, and held instead that rights in published works were
a purely statutory creation.117 But in 1787, when the clause was drafted, selection of the
term “secured” may have meant that the Framers understood copyright to have been a
natural right pre-existing at common law.118 At least, Madison in Federalist 43 prompts
that conclusion, for, in justifying the power granted to Congress to provide for copyright
and patents, he asserts that “The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in
Great Britain to be a right of common law.”119
If the starting point for federal copyright seemed to assume the author’s preexisting property rights120, the first statutes, enacted in 1790 for maps, charts and
books,121 and in 1802 for prints and engravings,122 prompt a different conclusion. The
statutes were heavily inspired by (not to say largely plagiarized from) the Statute of Anne
and Hogarth’s Act. But the formalities imposed were more burdensome than their
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English counterparts.123 More importantly, where the English statutes and their early
judicial interpretations confined formalities to specific statutory remedies,124 the US
statutes conditioned the existence and enforceability of the right on compliance with the
registration and deposit formalities. If there was any ambiguity regarding the availability
of general common law remedies for violations of the 1790 Act in the absence of
compliance with formalities, the 1802 Act, which added the notice formality and imposed
it on 1790 Act works, left no doubt that the work would never attain federal protection if
the formalities went unfulfilled.125 Formalities proved so essential to US copyright that
one federal court, endeavoring in 1829 to determine whether a “daily price quote” could
qualify for copyright, concluded that ephemera of this kind, whose utility and value
vanish after a day, could not be copyrightable subject matter within the statute because
they could not comply with formalities directing the proprietor to publish a record of the
work’s publication for four weeks in one or more newspapers, and to deposit the work
within six months of publication.126
Apart from that decision, there appears to be no early caselaw addressing what
subject matter came within the statutory categories of “any map, chart or book” or “prints
and engravings.” But a review of early copyright registration records suggests that
123
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“book” was broadly understood to encompass dramatic and musical works. Thus, of 263
registrations made with the federal district court in Pennsylvania between 1790 and 1800,
2 were for plays, and 12 were for a variety of musical works, including a single song, and
a collection of republican songs. During the same period in Massachusetts, of 198
registrations, two were for plays and 16 for musical works, of which 11 were hymnals.
By contrast, in more worldly New York, with a total of 103 registrations, 5 of the
registrations were for musical works, only one of them was a hymnal, the others were
operas and dance music, along with 3 plays.127
With respect to rights protected, the general US approach was highly positivistic.
Congress, not the courts, established and expanded the scope of copyright. Stowe v
Thomas128 is a notable example. Harriet Beecher Stowe complained of the unauthorized
translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. But the statute then afforded rights only to print,
publish and vend. The court characterized statutory copyright as a derogation from the
public domain. It ruled that once Stowe’s work was published it “bec[a]me as much
public property as [the creations] of Homer or Cervantes.” Only those rights specified by
the statute survived the dedication to the public that publication effected. According to
the court, a translation might be a copy of Stowe’s “thoughts or conceptions, but in no
correct sense can it be called a copy of her book.”129
The legal positivism characterizing Stowe and similar decisions received fullest
expression in Wheaton v Peters, which is sometimes called the US counterpart to
Donaldson, because the Supreme Court there rejected common law copyright.130 The
dispute, however, concerned compliance with formalities, not expiration of the statutory
term, (over which there seems to have been no dispute). 131 The US high court’s denial of
common law rights was far clearer and more sweeping than the Peers’. Henry Wheaton
had been the reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Upon his retirement from
that post, his successor Richard Peters not only published new volumes covering new
decisions of the Court, but also reissued Wheaton’s reports, without Wheaton’s
commentaries. Today, the decision is remembered principally for its holding, almost in
passing in the last sentence of a lengthy majority opinion, that “the court are unanimously
of the opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions
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delivered by this court. . .”132 Most of the opinions and the arguments of counsel,
however, addressed the legal foundation of authors’ exclusive rights.
Wheaton’s claim encountered the objection that he had no federal statutory rights
because he had failed to comply with the multiple formalities imposed by the 1790 and
1802 statutes. Although insisting he had acquitted himself of those obligations, Wheaton
also rejoined that if his statutory copyright claim failed, he nonetheless enjoyed
enforceable common law rights. A 3-2 majority of the court followed Peters’ argument
that, whatever the state of affairs in England, in the US, copyright was purely statutory.
The court determined that there was no federal common law,133 and, as to the States,
before Independence, Pennsylvania, where Wheaton’s reports had first been published
and registered, had no common law of copyright in published works. As a result,
copyright was a statutory creature from the start. The State copyright statutes of the preConstitutional period having been supplanted by the federal statute, it was solely to the
1790 and 1802 enactments that Wheaton must look for his post-publication rights.
Congress having created the right, compliance with every jot and tittle of statutory
formalities was essential to its vesting and enforceability.
Wheaton had tried to support his claim of common law rights by stressing that the
Constitutional copyright clause and the 1790 Act “secured” the exclusive rights of
authors, rather than “vesting” them, as had the Statute of Anne. The latter suggests a new
grant, while the former evokes a confirmation of prior rights. If the constitution gave
Congress the power to “secure” authors’ rights, the argument went, that must imply that
the rights pre-existed the constitution. Congress would be reinforcing, rather than
creating exclusive rights in the writings of authors. Wheaton’s counsel asserted: “Had
the convention designed to take away, or to authorize congress to take away the common
law property, they would have used the words vest, or grant; and would have carefully
avoided the word secure.”134
The majority made short work of this contention. It observed that the
constitutional clause employs “securing” with respect to both the writings of authors and
the discoveries of inventors. Yet it is clear that patents were not protected at common
law. The word cannot, the majority insisted, at once mean pre-existing rights for
copyright and newly created rights for patents. If the word is to have the same meaning
for both, then it can only mean a new grant.135 The drafting history of the patent132
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copyright clause, however, suggests that this reading was not in fact inevitable: the
copyright and patent parts had originally been proposed separately and were merged into
one clause, perhaps without full consideration of how the gerund would distribute across
the now-combined indirect objects.136 But the Wheaton court’s awareness or ignorance
of this history does not matter. In 1834, any argument built on “securing” was doomed to
fail, for reasons extraneous to competing conceptions of the author’s and the public’s
domains.
The reasons go back to 1798, when the New York legislature granted Robert
Livingston “the sole right and advantage of making and employing the steam boat” for a
term of 20 years provided that Livingston within a year’s time demonstrate that he had in
fact built a steamboat.137 Livingston teamed up with Robert Fulton, but, unable to meet
the deadline, they succeeded in obtaining successive extensions of the monopoly. In
April 1808, they launched a 20-ton steamboat capable of going up river on the Hudson at
the stately speed of four miles an hour. Whereupon the New York legislature granted
them another five years’ exclusivity, with the possibility of further grants to a total of 30
years. The New York courts routinely enforced these monopolies.138 Students of
American constitutional law will recognize the facts underlying one of the Marshall
court’s signal federalism decisions, Gibbons v. Ogden,139 from 1824. The Supreme Court
there held that New York’s monopolies on steamboat ferry service on the Hudson
conflicted with Congress’ constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. Gibbons
v Ogden thus is celebrated as one of the cornerstones of federal power;140 its relationship
to intellectual property and its foreshadowing of Wheaton v Peters, seems to have passed
unobserved.
Counsel in Gibbons and in earlier New York cases involving the steamboat
monopoly devoted much of their argument to New York’s power to confer patents for
inventions, a power asserted to be concurrent with the federal Congress’ powers under
the patent-copyright clause. In broad outline, the argument went as follows. The
Constitution provides for Congress’ power to “secure” the exclusive rights of authors and
inventors. The term “securing” implies pre-existing rights. Copyright is such a right, as it
has been recognized as a right at common law. Madison in Federalist 43 adverted to this
136
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and further urged that inventions ought for the same labor-rewarding reasons also to
come within Congress’ power to regulate through a patent system. Thus, even though
historically there was no common law patent, nonetheless the logic supporting common
law copyright ought to apply to patents as well. In other words, there should be residual
authority to recognize patents at common law. But, in the absence of federal common
law, the relevant source of law will be the common law of the several States. Nothing in
the constitutional clause suggests that the grant of authority to Congress was intended to
displace the States’ pre-existing rights. Therefore the States enjoy and retain the power
to grant patent rights.141
The steamboat monopolists thus built from the foundation of “securing” an
elaborate construct whose practical effect would have eviscerated federal power. New
York’s steamboat monopolies were creating precisely the kinds of barriers to interstate
trade that had hobbled the new nation under the Articles of Confederation – and that had
occasioned the adoption of the federal constitution in the first place.142 The monopolies
conflicted with federal legislation governing navigation, a prerogative Congress enjoyed
by virtue of its power to regulate commerce among the several States. Justice Marshall’s
opinion gives only the slightest hint of the roiling patent power controversy:
As this [analysis of the commerce power] decides the cause, it is unnecessary to
enter in an examination of that part of the constitution which empowers Congress
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.143
The relevance of Gibbons v Ogden to our exploration of the respective domains of
author and public in early US copyright, I suggest, is to have taken “securing” out of
contention as a basis for non statutory authors’ rights pre-existing and concurrent with the
federal statute. “Securing” had become a by-word for States’ rights, for national subunits’ exercise of an economic regulatory power which could undermine the larger nation
state. If “securing” meant that the States not only previously had but concurrently
enjoyed power to protect published works, the pairing of patent and copyright in the
constitutional clause could mean that States also retained that power with respect to
inventions. Whatever the deleterious effect on interstate commerce from State regulation
of works of authorship, the impact stemming from competing state regulation of
inventions was both apparent and unacceptable.
It is unlikely that Madison’s reference in Federalist 43 to common law copyright
was intended to encourage such a result. Indeed, Madison’s remark in the same dispatch
that the States “cannot separately make effectual provision” for the rights of authors and
141
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inventors144 suggests that he believed that only the federal entity could effectively ensure
protection.145 This may not mean that he believed that the States should not be permitted
to provide for authors and inventors, but it is doubtful that he anticipated that the States
would compete with the federal government in making such provision. It is more
probable that Madison’s reference to authors’ common law rights in Britain served the
rhetorical purpose of equating authors’ rights with the claims of natural justice. Whether
or not Madison thought through the consequences of an enforceable common law right in
the United States, in the absence of federal common law, implementing State common
law rights in published works in the American system would have created an intractable
federalism problem.
I do not wish to leave you with the impression that, after Wheaton, there was no
common law copyright in the US, and that, accordingly, the author’s domain was strictly
limited to the narrow realm of the federal statutes. The public domain began with
publication. An unpublished work, as a chattel, remained the object of common law
rights, and this was still true until 1978.146 Over time, moreover, US courts elaborated a
parallel universe of common law rights in works which, albeit technically “unpublished”
because they had not been distributed in copies to the general public, had nonetheless
encountered significant, indeed sometimes massive public exposure.147 Borrowing from
old English decisions holding that a public performance was not a “publication,”148 US
courts created a common law right of public performance.149 Thus, notwithstanding
Congress’ addition, in 1856, of a public performance right to statutory copyright,150 a
playwright could invoke common law rights to prevent a rival theater from producing his
play so long as the original remained unpublished. And, because it was not a
“publication,” the public delivery of a lecture before enormous crowds would not forfeit
the author’s common law right to determine whether and when to distribute the work in
copies thereafter. The rather strained notion of publication was motivated in large part by
courts’ awareness that, were the work to be deemed “published,” and had the author not
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complied with all applicable federal statutory formalities, the work would go into the
public domain, and all protection, state or federal, would be lost.151
Another area in which state common law and federal copyright diverged was the
treatment of foreign authors. The first US copyright statute § 5, emulating the Statute of
Anne s 7, withheld protection from works of foreign authors first published abroad.
Because this kind of provision remained in the US copyright law until 1891, English
works were regularly pirated in the US.152 By contrast, unpublished works were
protected at state common law, for reasons strongly evocative of natural rights, as an
1872 New York decision illustrates:
The right to literary property is as sacred as that to any other species of property.
The courts of the State are open to an alien friend pursuing his property, and
seeking to recover it from a wrong-doer, and there is nothing in any positive law,
or in the policy of the government, which would close the door against the same
alien friend seeking protection for the fruits of his mental labor, by restraining its
publication against his wishes. The protection afforded by the common law to
literary labor is very slight at best, but such as it is, it is accorded to alien friend
and citizen alike, and both are regarded with equal favor.153
Thus, even in a system as positivist as US copyright, judges found occasion to recognize
authors’ extra-statutory rights, or, if you prefer, to compromise the public domain.
Conclusion
It is so well established today that copyright cannot, and should not, last
forever,154 that it may be difficult to understand the appeal of perpetual common law
copyright in published works. But in both Britain and especially France, demands for
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perpetual copyright persisted into the 19th century. The expression “fall into the public
domain” evokes the devastation of a fall from grace. Indeed, the 19th-century poet Alfred
de Vigny amplified the sense of desolation: he evoked the expiration of copyright as
“tomber dans le gouffre du domaine public” – to fall into the sink hole of the public
domain.155
Gallic hyperbole notwithstanding, I think perpetuity was the punchline of a
syllogism whose first proposition may have been the most important for authors’ rights
advocates: an author’s intellectual labor gives rise to property rights; property rights are
perpetual; therefore the author’s right must be perpetual, too. To question the perpetuity
of the right may be to unravel the syllogism, and undermine its premise. If copyright is
not perpetual, then it cannot be property. If it is not property, then authors’ efforts are
denigrated; authors become uniquely disadvantaged among those who labor.156 This, to
echo Lord Mansfield’s celebrated litany in Millar v Taylor, is not “just.”157 Finally, there
may be more than felt justice animating the calls for an endless author’s domain; then as
now, copyright advocates have had literary affinities, unfulfilled artistic yearnings
reluctantly redirected toward juridical rather than creative endeavors. Blackstone himself
was one of these closeted copyright lawyers.158 Yielding to his Arcadian urges, he
penned the wistful “Lawyer’s farewell to his muse,” which, in conclusion, I shall unfairly
(but mercifully) abridge:
The Lawyer’s Farewell to His Muse
Written in the Year 1744 by William Blackstone
As, by some tyrant’s stern command,
A wretch forsakes his native land,
In foreign climes condemn’d to roam
An endless exile from his home;
So I, thus doom’d from thee to part,
Gay queen of Fancy and of Art,
Reluctant move, with doubtful mind,
Oft stop, and often look behind.
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Me wrangling courts, and Stubborn Law,
To smoak, and crowds, and cities draw;
There selfish Faction rules the day,
And Pride and Av’rice throng the Way:
Adieu, celestial Nymph, adieu:
Shakespear no more thy sylvan son,
Nor all the art of Addison,
Pope’s heav’n-strung lyre, nor Waller’s ease,
Nor Milton’s mighty self must please:
Instead of these, a formal band
In furs and coifs around me stand;
With sounds uncouth and accents dry
That grate the soul of harmony,
Each pedant sage unlocks his store
Of mystic, dark, discordant lore;
And points with tott’ring hand the ways
That lead me to the thorny maze.
There, in a winding, close retreat,
Is Justice doom’d to fix her seat,
There, fenc’d by bulwarks of the Law,
She keeps the wond’ring world in awe,
Then welcome business, welcome strife,
Welcome the cares, the thorns of life,
The visage wan, the pore-blind sight,
The toil by day, the lamp at night,
The tedious forms, the solemn prate,
The pert dispute, the dull debate,
The drowsy bench, the babling Hall,
For thee, fair Justice, welcome all!

30

